Map Ma Lam – 6631 iii – 1970 – 1972
To View Photo’s or Purchase this map follow links below;
https://www.ebay.com/itm/365734361753
The 1970 info (June 1972 Print) map covers southern Bình Thuận Province between the coastal plain and the inland highlands. It remained an active counter-insurgency area throughout the war.
Quán, Phan Lý, Phan Lý Chàm and Ma Lâm lay along Quốc Lộ 1 (QL1), a vital supply route between Saigon and II Corps. Viet Cong forces regularly mined the highway, staged ambushes and harassed military convoys, requiring constant ARVN security patrols and engineer clearance operations. Thiện Giáo served as an important ARVN district headquarters, with Regional and Popular Forces conducting patrols into the surrounding countryside. Government control was strongest in the towns and along QL1, while many rural areas remained contested, particularly at night.
Ma Lâm, overlooked by Núi Một, and the nearby hills including Núi Ta Đôn provided excellent observation over roads and valleys. Both government and Viet Cong forces sought control of this high ground for reconnaissance and security. The Song Khan and Song Kau rivers, together with Trail LTL 7, formed useful movement corridors through the area. Local Viet Cong units used these routes to move personnel and supplies while avoiding the more heavily patrolled highway.
Ấp Hòa Thành Military Post was one of several local security bases protecting villages and supporting patrol operations. Such posts were frequent targets of sniper fire, mortar attacks and small guerrilla assaults. US involvement consisted mainly of advisers supporting ARVN units, with helicopter mobility, artillery and tactical air support used during search-and-clear operations. Military activity focused on convoy security, patrols and disrupting local Viet Cong infrastructure rather than large-scale battles.
The Viet Cong maintained local guerrilla networks responsible for intelligence, taxation, recruitment and attacks on roads, outposts and government officials. By 1970, allied operations had reduced permanent Viet Cong control, but much of the rural interior remained contested and insurgents retained freedom of movement away from the main population centres.
Phum Hay - Peli Trap – 6437 iii
To View Photo’s or Purchase this map follow link below;
https://www.ebay.com/itm/366557165197
This map covers one of the most active cross-border operational areas of the Vietnam War, straddling the Kontum Province–Cambodia frontier. By 1970 the region was dominated by North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces rather than local Viet Cong units and formed part of the western approaches to the Ho Chi Minh Trail logistics network.
Plei Trap was an isolated US Special Forces CIDG camp established to monitor infiltration routes entering Kontum Province from Cambodia. The camp supported reconnaissance, border surveillance and interdiction operations before being overrun by the North Vietnamese during the Battle of Plei Trap in October 1967. The battle involved repeated ground assaults supported by heavy mortar and recoilless rifle fire before the camp was evacuated by helicopter after sustaining severe damage. Following its loss, the area remained under strong NVA influence.
The Plei Trap Valley became a major infiltration corridor linking Cambodian base areas with western Kontum Province. Trails, streams and dense jungle allowed the movement of troops, weapons and supplies largely concealed from aerial observation.
Trails 613 and 615 formed part of the extensive logistical network feeding the Ho Chi Minh Trail system. These routes carried troops, ammunition and supplies from northeastern Cambodia into the Central Highlands and were frequent targets for aerial reconnaissance, tactical air strikes and B-52 Arc Light missions.
Hill 278 and Hill 288 overlooked key approaches through the valley and were tactically important observation points. Both sides used similar high ground for surveillance, artillery adjustment and defensive positions.
Phum Hay, Phum Saop, Srok Virachey and Khet Ratanakiri lay within Cambodian territory used extensively by the NVA as sanctuary and logistics areas. Following the 1970 Cambodian Campaign, US and ARVN forces conducted cross-border operations against supply depots, headquarters and base areas throughout the region.
The border area supported numerous long-range reconnaissance missions by US Special Forces, MACV-SOG reconnaissance teams and indigenous reconnaissance personnel. Patrols crossed into Cambodia to locate infiltration routes, truck parks, supply caches and command facilities, often directing tactical air strikes against identified targets.
By 1970 the region was firmly controlled by the North Vietnamese Army, with little sustained South Vietnamese government presence outside temporary cross-border operations. It remained one of the principal infiltration corridors supplying NVA forces operating throughout Kontum, Pleiku and the Central Highlands until the end of the war.
Ta Dath – 6232 iii
To View Photo’s or Purchase this map follow link below;
https://www.ebay.com/itm/800385720511
This map covers the northern Tây Ninh Province border with Cambodia, one of the most heavily contested regions of III Corps. The area formed a principal infiltration corridor from Cambodia into South Vietnam and was used extensively by the Viet Cong and later the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) throughout the war.
Highway QL22 was the main military supply route between Tây Ninh, Katum and the Cambodian border. It carried troops, armour and logistics to frontier bases and was subjected to frequent mining, ambushes, sniper attacks and roadblocks. Convoy security and route clearance were continuous ARVN and US Army tasks.
Katum Special Forces Camp was one of the principal US Special Forces border surveillance bases in Tây Ninh Province. It monitored infiltration routes, supported CIDG operations and launched reconnaissance patrols toward the Cambodian frontier. The camp also served as a staging point for larger US and ARVN operations into the border region.
Ta Dath Special Forces Camp protected another important border crossing and supported reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and patrol operations. Together with Katum, it formed part of the chain of frontier camps intended to detect and disrupt enemy movement from Cambodia.
Trail 248 was one of numerous infiltration routes connecting Cambodian base areas with Highway 22 and inland operating areas. The flat terrain, scrub and bushland provided excellent concealment for movement of troops and supplies despite offering little natural high ground.
The Military Post and later Fire Support Base BM14 on QL22 provided artillery support for convoy protection and offensive operations. Fire support bases along the highway were regularly subjected to mortar, rocket and ground attacks aimed at disrupting allied operations.
Soc Ky and nearby villages lay within an area where government control was largely confined to military positions and the highway. Much of the surrounding countryside experienced regular Viet Cong influence, particularly during the early years of the war.
The Cambodian districts across the border in Kampong Cham Province provided important sanctuary for Viet Cong and NVA units. These areas contained supply depots, staging camps and command facilities beyond the reach of South Vietnamese forces until cross-border operations began in 1970.
US operations throughout the area included search-and-destroy missions, convoy escorts, reconnaissance patrols, helicopter assaults and repeated sweeps aimed at locating enemy base areas and infiltration routes. The region was also frequently targeted by artillery, tactical air strikes and B-52 Arc Light missions.
By 1966 the border region was already one of the Viet Cong's strongest areas of influence. Although allied forces maintained the Special Forces camps and Highway 22, large areas away from the road remained under effective Viet Cong control, allowing continued movement of personnel and supplies between Cambodia and Tây Ninh Province.
Khang Hung (US Named, Soc Trang) – 6128 ii
To View Photo’s or Purchase this map follow links below;
https://www.ebay.com/itm/366557290405
This map covers the Sóc Trăng area of southern South Vietnam in Phong Dinh and Ba Xuyên Provinces, a key Mekong Delta operational area. On many US Army, aviation and Special Forces maps and reports, Khánh Hưng was referred to simply as Sóc Trăng, reflecting the importance of the district and its military facilities.
Quốc Lộ 4 (QL4), now Highway 1, was the principal supply route through the Mekong Delta, linking Saigon with Cần Thơ and the southern provinces. It was a constant target for Viet Cong mining, ambushes, sniper attacks and bridge sabotage, requiring continuous ARVN and US convoy protection, engineer clearance and patrol operations.
Sóc Trăng contained an important South Vietnamese military complex, airfield and US advisory presence. The airfield supported fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, logistics and medical evacuation missions throughout the western Delta. US Special Forces personnel operated from the area in advisory and intelligence roles, while American aviation units regularly used the base during combat operations.
The Ba Xuyên Special Forces Camp formed part of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) programme, supporting local security, intelligence gathering and operations against Viet Cong infrastructure throughout the province.
The extensive canal system, including Kinh Bố Thảo, together with countless waterways, rice paddies and mangrove areas, heavily influenced military operations. The Viet Cong used canals for movement of personnel, weapons and supplies, often travelling by small boats beyond the reach of road patrols.
Bãi Xàu, Mỹ Xuyên, Kế Sách, Long Mỹ and Long Phú were all active counter-insurgency districts. Government control generally remained strongest in the towns and along major roads, while many surrounding rural areas experienced regular Viet Cong influence, particularly at night.
Provincial Roads TL115 and TL42 linked villages away from QL4 and were frequently mined or ambushed. Maintaining communications along these roads required continual security operations by ARVN Regional and Popular Forces supported by US advisers.
The Viet Cong maintained an extensive political and military infrastructure throughout the province, conducting taxation, recruitment, intelligence collection and attacks against government outposts, police stations and district headquarters. Small-unit ambushes, harassment fire and attacks on isolated positions were far more common than large conventional engagements.
US operations centred on mobile riverine patrols, helicopter assaults, search-and-destroy missions and combined operations with ARVN units. The Delta's waterways required close cooperation between ground forces, helicopters and the US Navy's Mobile Riverine Force to locate and engage Viet Cong units.
By the mid to late 1960s, much of the countryside remained contested despite a strong government presence in Sóc Trăng itself. The Viet Cong retained considerable freedom of movement through canals, rice fields and isolated hamlets, making the province one of the most persistent insurgency areas in the Mekong Delta.
Tan Chau – 6030 iv – Vietnam Cambodia Border
To View Photo’s or Purchase this map follow links below;
https://www.ebay.com/itm/366557313361
This map covers the northern Châu Đốc Province along the Cambodian border, centred on Tân Châu and the upper Mekong River. During the Vietnam War this was one of the principal infiltration and logistics areas in the western Mekong Delta, where waterways crossing the international border allowed the movement of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong personnel, weapons and supplies.
The Mekong River (Cửu Long), the Song Hậu Giang (Bassac River), Song Châu Đốc and the Tonlé Bassac formed major transportation corridors. While essential for civilian commerce, they were also heavily used by the Viet Cong for covert movement using sampans and small cargo boats, particularly at night. Allied forces maintained frequent river patrols, inspections and interdiction operations to disrupt this traffic.
Tân Châu was an important ARVN district and river security centre. Government forces maintained control of the town and principal waterways, but extensive patrols were required to secure the surrounding canals, floodplains and border approaches.
An Phú, Nhơn Hội, Vĩnh Lộc, Phú Hội, Châu Phú, Khánh An and Khánh Bình occupied a border district where government influence weakened away from populated centres. The flooded terrain, canals and vegetation provided excellent concealment for Viet Cong movement and temporary base areas.
The large wetland of Búng Bình Thiên Lớn offered concealment and access between waterways, making it useful for small-unit infiltration and logistics. Numerous canals throughout the area complicated ground operations and favoured guerrilla tactics.
Across the border, Srok Leuk Dek, Prek Chrey and Takeo Province served as important sanctuary and staging areas. Cambodian territory was used by the Viet Cong and later the NVA to establish supply depots, regroup after operations and move forces into Châu Đốc Province before withdrawing across the border.
Provincial Roads TL53 and TL138 linked border settlements but were vulnerable to mining, ambushes and harassment. Security operations concentrated on maintaining communications between isolated government positions and protecting civilian traffic.
US operations consisted primarily of advisory support to ARVN units, helicopter reconnaissance, river patrols and surveillance of border crossings. US Navy and Mobile Riverine Force elements, working alongside South Vietnamese river forces, conducted patrols on the Mekong and Bassac Rivers to intercept infiltration and supply movements.
The Viet Cong relied on small-unit tactics, including ambushes, attacks on outposts, mining of roads and waterways, intelligence collection and taxation within rural communities. Large conventional battles were uncommon, with operations characterised instead by continual guerrilla activity.
By 1970 the principal towns and permanent government installations remained under South Vietnamese control, while significant sections of the rural border zone and waterways remained contested. The proximity of Cambodian sanctuary allowed enemy forces to maintain a persistent presence despite repeated ARVN and allied security operations.
Co Do 6029 ii – Map information 1966
To View Photo’s or Purchase this map follow links below;
https://www.ebay.com/itm/366557332261
This map covers the Cờ Đỏ district area west of Cần Thơ in Phong Dinh Province, extending toward the An Giang border. In 1966 the region formed part of the central Mekong Delta, where military operations centred on securing canals, villages and rice-producing areas against an entrenched Viet Cong insurgency.
The canal network, including the Kinh Rạch Sỏi–Vàm Cống waterway and numerous smaller canals, was the dominant feature of military operations. These waterways served as the principal routes for civilian transport, but were also extensively used by Viet Cong units to move personnel, weapons and supplies between base areas while avoiding major roads.
Provincial Road TL135 linked district settlements and required regular ARVN security patrols. Roads, canal crossings and bridges were frequent targets for mines, ambushes and sabotage intended to disrupt government movement.
Cờ Đỏ Airstrip supported local government and military operations, including liaison, resupply, casualty evacuation and reconnaissance flights. It provided rapid access to otherwise isolated districts within the Delta.
Ấp Phụng served as a local government administrative centre and was typical of villages where government forces maintained an official presence while Viet Cong political cadres attempted to influence surrounding rural communities through taxation, recruitment and intelligence collection.
The numerous watchtowers along the Kinh Số Một canal and around Ấp Tôn Đôn originated during the French counter-insurgency campaigns of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Many remained in use or were adapted by South Vietnamese forces as observation posts, local defence positions and communications points overlooking canals and approaches used by guerrilla forces.
Military activity consisted primarily of small-unit operations rather than large conventional battles. ARVN units, supported by US advisers, conducted patrols, canal sweeps, helicopter insertions and cordon-and-search operations aimed at locating Viet Cong units and disrupting their local infrastructure.
The Viet Cong controlled and maintained an extensive presence throughout the rural canal network, relying on ambushes, sniper attacks, mines, attacks on isolated outposts and covert movement by sampan through the waterways. Control generally favoured the South Vietnamese government in district centres and permanent military positions, while many outlying hamlets and canal systems remained contested, particularly after dark.
Bao Loc – 6532 ii – March 1969 Print
To View Photo’s or Purchase this map follow links below;
https://www.ebay.com/itm/366557384555
This map illustrates one of the shortcomings of the L7014 series. Although printed in March 1969, the base map was compiled largely from 1965 information and was already significantly out of date by the time it reached operational units. Following the 1968 Tet Offensive, substantial revisions were undertaken and new mapping compiled, but these corrections did not appear in print until the revised September 1971 edition. Personnel relying on this 1969 sheet would therefore have been operating with incomplete and, in several cases, inaccurate information.
The most significant omission is the newer and substantially larger airstrip constructed north of Bảo Lộc, which does not appear on this edition. The map instead shows the older military airstrip east of the town, originally established by the French during the First Indochina War and later occupied by South Vietnamese and US Special Forces. By 1969, the newer northern airfield had become the more important aviation facility supporting military operations along Highway QL20.
Equally significant is the condition of the surrounding settlements. The 1969 map still depicts numerous villages that had been destroyed or abandoned during fighting prior to publication. Bảo Lộc itself had suffered extensive damage during the Tet period and subsequent operations. The villages of B Su M Rac northwest of Bảo Lộc, Bruoi K Me, Bros Dor and Gung Ra Ja had also been destroyed or were no longer functioning settlements, yet all continued to appear as active locations on the map. This created the potential for serious navigational and operational errors.
Bảo Lộc occupied a strategic position on Quốc Lộ 20, the principal highway linking Saigon with Di Linh, Đà Lạt and the Central Highlands. The route carried military convoys, fuel and supplies and was one of the most important logistical roads in II Corps. Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces regularly mined the highway, established ambushes and attacked bridges and convoys, requiring continuous engineer clearance and security patrols.
The Bảo Lộc Military Post and adjacent Special Forces Camp formed one of the principal security installations protecting the QL20 corridor. Built around the former French airstrip dating from the late 1940s, the camp was occupied by US Army Special Forces advisers working with CIDG and later Regional Force units. Its mission included protecting Highway 20, conducting reconnaissance patrols into the surrounding highlands, gathering intelligence on enemy movement, supporting Montagnard communities and directing artillery and tactical air support against identified enemy concentrations. Helicopters and light aircraft regularly operated from the airstrip for resupply, reconnaissance and casualty evacuation until the newer northern airfield assumed much of this role.
The area surrounding Bảo Lộc formed part of the southern approaches to the Central Highlands and was used by North Vietnamese Army units moving between Lâm Đồng Province and infiltration routes further west. Although not on the main Ho Chi Minh Trail, the surrounding forests provided concealment for troop movements and temporary staging areas.
The Bảo Lộc Agricultural College remained a prominent landmark and reference point for military navigation. Huong Lâm, Đạ R'gna and Di Linh lay along important lines of communication supporting operations between the coast and the Central Highlands.
Everest Farm on QL20 became a recognised military reference point appearing in operational reports and convoy documentation. Its position on the highway made it a convenient checkpoint and navigation marker for units moving between Bảo Lộc and Di Linh.
Military activity throughout the district consisted largely of convoy escorts, reconnaissance patrols, road security, search-and-destroy operations and protection of isolated government positions. Viet Cong and later North Vietnamese forces relied on ambushes, mines, sniper attacks and temporary occupation of high ground overlooking QL20 rather than sustained attacks against Bảo Lộc itself. Government control remained strongest in the town and along the highway, while much of the surrounding forested terrain remained contested throughout the war
For Further information on this map, please view the September 1971 version for comparison.
Bao Loc – 6532 ii – September 1971 Print
To View Photo’s or Purchase this map follow links below;
https://www.ebay.com/itm/366557397327
This revised L7014 sheet, printed in September 1971, incorporates mapping compiled following the 1968 Tet Offensive and corrects many of the deficiencies present on the earlier March 1969 edition, which had relied largely on outdated 1965 survey information. As a result, this edition provides a far more accurate representation of the military and physical landscape around Bảo Lộc during the latter years of the Vietnam War.
Most notably, the map now depicts the newer and substantially larger airstrip north of Bảo Lộc, which had become the principal aviation facility supporting military operations along Quốc Lộ 20. The older military airstrip east of the town, originally constructed by the French during the First Indochina War and later occupied by South Vietnamese and US Special Forces, is also shown, illustrating the transition between the two facilities.
The revised mapping also reflects the effects of the fighting that followed Tet. Bảo Lộc itself had suffered considerable damage, while settlements including B Su M Rac northwest of the town, Bruoi K Me, Bros Dor and Gung Ra Ja had been destroyed or abandoned and are no longer depicted as functioning villages. These corrections significantly improved the accuracy of navigation and operational planning.
Bảo Lộc occupied a strategic position on Quốc Lộ 20, the principal highway linking Saigon with Di Linh, Đà Lạt and the Central Highlands. The route carried military convoys, fuel and supplies and remained one of the most important logistical roads in II Corps. Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces regularly mined the highway, established ambushes and attacked bridges and convoys, requiring continuous engineer clearance and security patrols.
The Bảo Lộc Military Post and adjacent Special Forces Camp formed one of the principal security installations protecting the QL20 corridor. Built around the former French airstrip dating from the late 1940s, the camp was occupied by US Army Special Forces advisers working with CIDG and later Regional Force units. Its mission included protecting Highway 20, conducting reconnaissance patrols into the surrounding highlands, gathering intelligence on enemy movement, supporting Montagnard communities and directing artillery and tactical air support against identified enemy concentrations. Following construction of the new northern airfield, the original airstrip assumed a reduced operational role while remaining an important military installation.
The area surrounding Bảo Lộc formed part of the southern approaches to the Central Highlands and was used by North Vietnamese Army units moving between Lâm Đồng Province and infiltration routes further west. Although not on the main Ho Chi Minh Trail, the surrounding forests provided concealment for troop movements and temporary staging areas.
The Bảo Lộc Agricultural College remained a prominent landmark and navigation reference. Huong Lâm, Đạ R'gna and Di Linh lay along important lines of communication supporting operations between the coast and the Central Highlands. Everest Farm on QL20 was a recognised military reference point, frequently appearing in operational reports and convoy documentation.
Military activity throughout the district consisted largely of convoy escorts, reconnaissance patrols, road security, search-and-destroy operations and protection of isolated government positions. Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces relied on ambushes, mines, sniper attacks and temporary occupation of high ground overlooking QL20 rather than sustained attacks against Bảo Lộc itself. Government control remained strongest in the town and along the highway, while much of the surrounding forested terrain remained contested throughout the war.
For comparison, the earlier March 1969 edition provides an excellent illustration of how rapidly military mapping became outdated during the Vietnam War, depicting terrain, settlements and aviation facilities that had already changed significantly before that map reached operational units.
To View Photo’s or Purchase this map follow links below;
https://www.ebay.com/itm/365734361753
The 1970 info (June 1972 Print) map covers southern Bình Thuận Province between the coastal plain and the inland highlands. It remained an active counter-insurgency area throughout the war.
Quán, Phan Lý, Phan Lý Chàm and Ma Lâm lay along Quốc Lộ 1 (QL1), a vital supply route between Saigon and II Corps. Viet Cong forces regularly mined the highway, staged ambushes and harassed military convoys, requiring constant ARVN security patrols and engineer clearance operations. Thiện Giáo served as an important ARVN district headquarters, with Regional and Popular Forces conducting patrols into the surrounding countryside. Government control was strongest in the towns and along QL1, while many rural areas remained contested, particularly at night.
Ma Lâm, overlooked by Núi Một, and the nearby hills including Núi Ta Đôn provided excellent observation over roads and valleys. Both government and Viet Cong forces sought control of this high ground for reconnaissance and security. The Song Khan and Song Kau rivers, together with Trail LTL 7, formed useful movement corridors through the area. Local Viet Cong units used these routes to move personnel and supplies while avoiding the more heavily patrolled highway.
Ấp Hòa Thành Military Post was one of several local security bases protecting villages and supporting patrol operations. Such posts were frequent targets of sniper fire, mortar attacks and small guerrilla assaults. US involvement consisted mainly of advisers supporting ARVN units, with helicopter mobility, artillery and tactical air support used during search-and-clear operations. Military activity focused on convoy security, patrols and disrupting local Viet Cong infrastructure rather than large-scale battles.
The Viet Cong maintained local guerrilla networks responsible for intelligence, taxation, recruitment and attacks on roads, outposts and government officials. By 1970, allied operations had reduced permanent Viet Cong control, but much of the rural interior remained contested and insurgents retained freedom of movement away from the main population centres.
Phum Hay - Peli Trap – 6437 iii
To View Photo’s or Purchase this map follow link below;
https://www.ebay.com/itm/366557165197
This map covers one of the most active cross-border operational areas of the Vietnam War, straddling the Kontum Province–Cambodia frontier. By 1970 the region was dominated by North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces rather than local Viet Cong units and formed part of the western approaches to the Ho Chi Minh Trail logistics network.
Plei Trap was an isolated US Special Forces CIDG camp established to monitor infiltration routes entering Kontum Province from Cambodia. The camp supported reconnaissance, border surveillance and interdiction operations before being overrun by the North Vietnamese during the Battle of Plei Trap in October 1967. The battle involved repeated ground assaults supported by heavy mortar and recoilless rifle fire before the camp was evacuated by helicopter after sustaining severe damage. Following its loss, the area remained under strong NVA influence.
The Plei Trap Valley became a major infiltration corridor linking Cambodian base areas with western Kontum Province. Trails, streams and dense jungle allowed the movement of troops, weapons and supplies largely concealed from aerial observation.
Trails 613 and 615 formed part of the extensive logistical network feeding the Ho Chi Minh Trail system. These routes carried troops, ammunition and supplies from northeastern Cambodia into the Central Highlands and were frequent targets for aerial reconnaissance, tactical air strikes and B-52 Arc Light missions.
Hill 278 and Hill 288 overlooked key approaches through the valley and were tactically important observation points. Both sides used similar high ground for surveillance, artillery adjustment and defensive positions.
Phum Hay, Phum Saop, Srok Virachey and Khet Ratanakiri lay within Cambodian territory used extensively by the NVA as sanctuary and logistics areas. Following the 1970 Cambodian Campaign, US and ARVN forces conducted cross-border operations against supply depots, headquarters and base areas throughout the region.
The border area supported numerous long-range reconnaissance missions by US Special Forces, MACV-SOG reconnaissance teams and indigenous reconnaissance personnel. Patrols crossed into Cambodia to locate infiltration routes, truck parks, supply caches and command facilities, often directing tactical air strikes against identified targets.
By 1970 the region was firmly controlled by the North Vietnamese Army, with little sustained South Vietnamese government presence outside temporary cross-border operations. It remained one of the principal infiltration corridors supplying NVA forces operating throughout Kontum, Pleiku and the Central Highlands until the end of the war.
Ta Dath – 6232 iii
To View Photo’s or Purchase this map follow link below;
https://www.ebay.com/itm/800385720511
This map covers the northern Tây Ninh Province border with Cambodia, one of the most heavily contested regions of III Corps. The area formed a principal infiltration corridor from Cambodia into South Vietnam and was used extensively by the Viet Cong and later the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) throughout the war.
Highway QL22 was the main military supply route between Tây Ninh, Katum and the Cambodian border. It carried troops, armour and logistics to frontier bases and was subjected to frequent mining, ambushes, sniper attacks and roadblocks. Convoy security and route clearance were continuous ARVN and US Army tasks.
Katum Special Forces Camp was one of the principal US Special Forces border surveillance bases in Tây Ninh Province. It monitored infiltration routes, supported CIDG operations and launched reconnaissance patrols toward the Cambodian frontier. The camp also served as a staging point for larger US and ARVN operations into the border region.
Ta Dath Special Forces Camp protected another important border crossing and supported reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and patrol operations. Together with Katum, it formed part of the chain of frontier camps intended to detect and disrupt enemy movement from Cambodia.
Trail 248 was one of numerous infiltration routes connecting Cambodian base areas with Highway 22 and inland operating areas. The flat terrain, scrub and bushland provided excellent concealment for movement of troops and supplies despite offering little natural high ground.
The Military Post and later Fire Support Base BM14 on QL22 provided artillery support for convoy protection and offensive operations. Fire support bases along the highway were regularly subjected to mortar, rocket and ground attacks aimed at disrupting allied operations.
Soc Ky and nearby villages lay within an area where government control was largely confined to military positions and the highway. Much of the surrounding countryside experienced regular Viet Cong influence, particularly during the early years of the war.
The Cambodian districts across the border in Kampong Cham Province provided important sanctuary for Viet Cong and NVA units. These areas contained supply depots, staging camps and command facilities beyond the reach of South Vietnamese forces until cross-border operations began in 1970.
US operations throughout the area included search-and-destroy missions, convoy escorts, reconnaissance patrols, helicopter assaults and repeated sweeps aimed at locating enemy base areas and infiltration routes. The region was also frequently targeted by artillery, tactical air strikes and B-52 Arc Light missions.
By 1966 the border region was already one of the Viet Cong's strongest areas of influence. Although allied forces maintained the Special Forces camps and Highway 22, large areas away from the road remained under effective Viet Cong control, allowing continued movement of personnel and supplies between Cambodia and Tây Ninh Province.
Khang Hung (US Named, Soc Trang) – 6128 ii
To View Photo’s or Purchase this map follow links below;
https://www.ebay.com/itm/366557290405
This map covers the Sóc Trăng area of southern South Vietnam in Phong Dinh and Ba Xuyên Provinces, a key Mekong Delta operational area. On many US Army, aviation and Special Forces maps and reports, Khánh Hưng was referred to simply as Sóc Trăng, reflecting the importance of the district and its military facilities.
Quốc Lộ 4 (QL4), now Highway 1, was the principal supply route through the Mekong Delta, linking Saigon with Cần Thơ and the southern provinces. It was a constant target for Viet Cong mining, ambushes, sniper attacks and bridge sabotage, requiring continuous ARVN and US convoy protection, engineer clearance and patrol operations.
Sóc Trăng contained an important South Vietnamese military complex, airfield and US advisory presence. The airfield supported fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, logistics and medical evacuation missions throughout the western Delta. US Special Forces personnel operated from the area in advisory and intelligence roles, while American aviation units regularly used the base during combat operations.
The Ba Xuyên Special Forces Camp formed part of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) programme, supporting local security, intelligence gathering and operations against Viet Cong infrastructure throughout the province.
The extensive canal system, including Kinh Bố Thảo, together with countless waterways, rice paddies and mangrove areas, heavily influenced military operations. The Viet Cong used canals for movement of personnel, weapons and supplies, often travelling by small boats beyond the reach of road patrols.
Bãi Xàu, Mỹ Xuyên, Kế Sách, Long Mỹ and Long Phú were all active counter-insurgency districts. Government control generally remained strongest in the towns and along major roads, while many surrounding rural areas experienced regular Viet Cong influence, particularly at night.
Provincial Roads TL115 and TL42 linked villages away from QL4 and were frequently mined or ambushed. Maintaining communications along these roads required continual security operations by ARVN Regional and Popular Forces supported by US advisers.
The Viet Cong maintained an extensive political and military infrastructure throughout the province, conducting taxation, recruitment, intelligence collection and attacks against government outposts, police stations and district headquarters. Small-unit ambushes, harassment fire and attacks on isolated positions were far more common than large conventional engagements.
US operations centred on mobile riverine patrols, helicopter assaults, search-and-destroy missions and combined operations with ARVN units. The Delta's waterways required close cooperation between ground forces, helicopters and the US Navy's Mobile Riverine Force to locate and engage Viet Cong units.
By the mid to late 1960s, much of the countryside remained contested despite a strong government presence in Sóc Trăng itself. The Viet Cong retained considerable freedom of movement through canals, rice fields and isolated hamlets, making the province one of the most persistent insurgency areas in the Mekong Delta.
Tan Chau – 6030 iv – Vietnam Cambodia Border
To View Photo’s or Purchase this map follow links below;
https://www.ebay.com/itm/366557313361
This map covers the northern Châu Đốc Province along the Cambodian border, centred on Tân Châu and the upper Mekong River. During the Vietnam War this was one of the principal infiltration and logistics areas in the western Mekong Delta, where waterways crossing the international border allowed the movement of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong personnel, weapons and supplies.
The Mekong River (Cửu Long), the Song Hậu Giang (Bassac River), Song Châu Đốc and the Tonlé Bassac formed major transportation corridors. While essential for civilian commerce, they were also heavily used by the Viet Cong for covert movement using sampans and small cargo boats, particularly at night. Allied forces maintained frequent river patrols, inspections and interdiction operations to disrupt this traffic.
Tân Châu was an important ARVN district and river security centre. Government forces maintained control of the town and principal waterways, but extensive patrols were required to secure the surrounding canals, floodplains and border approaches.
An Phú, Nhơn Hội, Vĩnh Lộc, Phú Hội, Châu Phú, Khánh An and Khánh Bình occupied a border district where government influence weakened away from populated centres. The flooded terrain, canals and vegetation provided excellent concealment for Viet Cong movement and temporary base areas.
The large wetland of Búng Bình Thiên Lớn offered concealment and access between waterways, making it useful for small-unit infiltration and logistics. Numerous canals throughout the area complicated ground operations and favoured guerrilla tactics.
Across the border, Srok Leuk Dek, Prek Chrey and Takeo Province served as important sanctuary and staging areas. Cambodian territory was used by the Viet Cong and later the NVA to establish supply depots, regroup after operations and move forces into Châu Đốc Province before withdrawing across the border.
Provincial Roads TL53 and TL138 linked border settlements but were vulnerable to mining, ambushes and harassment. Security operations concentrated on maintaining communications between isolated government positions and protecting civilian traffic.
US operations consisted primarily of advisory support to ARVN units, helicopter reconnaissance, river patrols and surveillance of border crossings. US Navy and Mobile Riverine Force elements, working alongside South Vietnamese river forces, conducted patrols on the Mekong and Bassac Rivers to intercept infiltration and supply movements.
The Viet Cong relied on small-unit tactics, including ambushes, attacks on outposts, mining of roads and waterways, intelligence collection and taxation within rural communities. Large conventional battles were uncommon, with operations characterised instead by continual guerrilla activity.
By 1970 the principal towns and permanent government installations remained under South Vietnamese control, while significant sections of the rural border zone and waterways remained contested. The proximity of Cambodian sanctuary allowed enemy forces to maintain a persistent presence despite repeated ARVN and allied security operations.
Co Do 6029 ii – Map information 1966
To View Photo’s or Purchase this map follow links below;
https://www.ebay.com/itm/366557332261
This map covers the Cờ Đỏ district area west of Cần Thơ in Phong Dinh Province, extending toward the An Giang border. In 1966 the region formed part of the central Mekong Delta, where military operations centred on securing canals, villages and rice-producing areas against an entrenched Viet Cong insurgency.
The canal network, including the Kinh Rạch Sỏi–Vàm Cống waterway and numerous smaller canals, was the dominant feature of military operations. These waterways served as the principal routes for civilian transport, but were also extensively used by Viet Cong units to move personnel, weapons and supplies between base areas while avoiding major roads.
Provincial Road TL135 linked district settlements and required regular ARVN security patrols. Roads, canal crossings and bridges were frequent targets for mines, ambushes and sabotage intended to disrupt government movement.
Cờ Đỏ Airstrip supported local government and military operations, including liaison, resupply, casualty evacuation and reconnaissance flights. It provided rapid access to otherwise isolated districts within the Delta.
Ấp Phụng served as a local government administrative centre and was typical of villages where government forces maintained an official presence while Viet Cong political cadres attempted to influence surrounding rural communities through taxation, recruitment and intelligence collection.
The numerous watchtowers along the Kinh Số Một canal and around Ấp Tôn Đôn originated during the French counter-insurgency campaigns of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Many remained in use or were adapted by South Vietnamese forces as observation posts, local defence positions and communications points overlooking canals and approaches used by guerrilla forces.
Military activity consisted primarily of small-unit operations rather than large conventional battles. ARVN units, supported by US advisers, conducted patrols, canal sweeps, helicopter insertions and cordon-and-search operations aimed at locating Viet Cong units and disrupting their local infrastructure.
The Viet Cong controlled and maintained an extensive presence throughout the rural canal network, relying on ambushes, sniper attacks, mines, attacks on isolated outposts and covert movement by sampan through the waterways. Control generally favoured the South Vietnamese government in district centres and permanent military positions, while many outlying hamlets and canal systems remained contested, particularly after dark.
Bao Loc – 6532 ii – March 1969 Print
To View Photo’s or Purchase this map follow links below;
https://www.ebay.com/itm/366557384555
This map illustrates one of the shortcomings of the L7014 series. Although printed in March 1969, the base map was compiled largely from 1965 information and was already significantly out of date by the time it reached operational units. Following the 1968 Tet Offensive, substantial revisions were undertaken and new mapping compiled, but these corrections did not appear in print until the revised September 1971 edition. Personnel relying on this 1969 sheet would therefore have been operating with incomplete and, in several cases, inaccurate information.
The most significant omission is the newer and substantially larger airstrip constructed north of Bảo Lộc, which does not appear on this edition. The map instead shows the older military airstrip east of the town, originally established by the French during the First Indochina War and later occupied by South Vietnamese and US Special Forces. By 1969, the newer northern airfield had become the more important aviation facility supporting military operations along Highway QL20.
Equally significant is the condition of the surrounding settlements. The 1969 map still depicts numerous villages that had been destroyed or abandoned during fighting prior to publication. Bảo Lộc itself had suffered extensive damage during the Tet period and subsequent operations. The villages of B Su M Rac northwest of Bảo Lộc, Bruoi K Me, Bros Dor and Gung Ra Ja had also been destroyed or were no longer functioning settlements, yet all continued to appear as active locations on the map. This created the potential for serious navigational and operational errors.
Bảo Lộc occupied a strategic position on Quốc Lộ 20, the principal highway linking Saigon with Di Linh, Đà Lạt and the Central Highlands. The route carried military convoys, fuel and supplies and was one of the most important logistical roads in II Corps. Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces regularly mined the highway, established ambushes and attacked bridges and convoys, requiring continuous engineer clearance and security patrols.
The Bảo Lộc Military Post and adjacent Special Forces Camp formed one of the principal security installations protecting the QL20 corridor. Built around the former French airstrip dating from the late 1940s, the camp was occupied by US Army Special Forces advisers working with CIDG and later Regional Force units. Its mission included protecting Highway 20, conducting reconnaissance patrols into the surrounding highlands, gathering intelligence on enemy movement, supporting Montagnard communities and directing artillery and tactical air support against identified enemy concentrations. Helicopters and light aircraft regularly operated from the airstrip for resupply, reconnaissance and casualty evacuation until the newer northern airfield assumed much of this role.
The area surrounding Bảo Lộc formed part of the southern approaches to the Central Highlands and was used by North Vietnamese Army units moving between Lâm Đồng Province and infiltration routes further west. Although not on the main Ho Chi Minh Trail, the surrounding forests provided concealment for troop movements and temporary staging areas.
The Bảo Lộc Agricultural College remained a prominent landmark and reference point for military navigation. Huong Lâm, Đạ R'gna and Di Linh lay along important lines of communication supporting operations between the coast and the Central Highlands.
Everest Farm on QL20 became a recognised military reference point appearing in operational reports and convoy documentation. Its position on the highway made it a convenient checkpoint and navigation marker for units moving between Bảo Lộc and Di Linh.
Military activity throughout the district consisted largely of convoy escorts, reconnaissance patrols, road security, search-and-destroy operations and protection of isolated government positions. Viet Cong and later North Vietnamese forces relied on ambushes, mines, sniper attacks and temporary occupation of high ground overlooking QL20 rather than sustained attacks against Bảo Lộc itself. Government control remained strongest in the town and along the highway, while much of the surrounding forested terrain remained contested throughout the war
For Further information on this map, please view the September 1971 version for comparison.
Bao Loc – 6532 ii – September 1971 Print
To View Photo’s or Purchase this map follow links below;
https://www.ebay.com/itm/366557397327
This revised L7014 sheet, printed in September 1971, incorporates mapping compiled following the 1968 Tet Offensive and corrects many of the deficiencies present on the earlier March 1969 edition, which had relied largely on outdated 1965 survey information. As a result, this edition provides a far more accurate representation of the military and physical landscape around Bảo Lộc during the latter years of the Vietnam War.
Most notably, the map now depicts the newer and substantially larger airstrip north of Bảo Lộc, which had become the principal aviation facility supporting military operations along Quốc Lộ 20. The older military airstrip east of the town, originally constructed by the French during the First Indochina War and later occupied by South Vietnamese and US Special Forces, is also shown, illustrating the transition between the two facilities.
The revised mapping also reflects the effects of the fighting that followed Tet. Bảo Lộc itself had suffered considerable damage, while settlements including B Su M Rac northwest of the town, Bruoi K Me, Bros Dor and Gung Ra Ja had been destroyed or abandoned and are no longer depicted as functioning villages. These corrections significantly improved the accuracy of navigation and operational planning.
Bảo Lộc occupied a strategic position on Quốc Lộ 20, the principal highway linking Saigon with Di Linh, Đà Lạt and the Central Highlands. The route carried military convoys, fuel and supplies and remained one of the most important logistical roads in II Corps. Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces regularly mined the highway, established ambushes and attacked bridges and convoys, requiring continuous engineer clearance and security patrols.
The Bảo Lộc Military Post and adjacent Special Forces Camp formed one of the principal security installations protecting the QL20 corridor. Built around the former French airstrip dating from the late 1940s, the camp was occupied by US Army Special Forces advisers working with CIDG and later Regional Force units. Its mission included protecting Highway 20, conducting reconnaissance patrols into the surrounding highlands, gathering intelligence on enemy movement, supporting Montagnard communities and directing artillery and tactical air support against identified enemy concentrations. Following construction of the new northern airfield, the original airstrip assumed a reduced operational role while remaining an important military installation.
The area surrounding Bảo Lộc formed part of the southern approaches to the Central Highlands and was used by North Vietnamese Army units moving between Lâm Đồng Province and infiltration routes further west. Although not on the main Ho Chi Minh Trail, the surrounding forests provided concealment for troop movements and temporary staging areas.
The Bảo Lộc Agricultural College remained a prominent landmark and navigation reference. Huong Lâm, Đạ R'gna and Di Linh lay along important lines of communication supporting operations between the coast and the Central Highlands. Everest Farm on QL20 was a recognised military reference point, frequently appearing in operational reports and convoy documentation.
Military activity throughout the district consisted largely of convoy escorts, reconnaissance patrols, road security, search-and-destroy operations and protection of isolated government positions. Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces relied on ambushes, mines, sniper attacks and temporary occupation of high ground overlooking QL20 rather than sustained attacks against Bảo Lộc itself. Government control remained strongest in the town and along the highway, while much of the surrounding forested terrain remained contested throughout the war.
For comparison, the earlier March 1969 edition provides an excellent illustration of how rapidly military mapping became outdated during the Vietnam War, depicting terrain, settlements and aviation facilities that had already changed significantly before that map reached operational units.